Trade wars by Doug Campbell
S
ometime in the upcoming
months, Robert Maricich will
find himself in what he 
acknowledges is a peculiar position.
His company, Century Furniture of
Hickory, N.C., will receive a check
from the U.S. government for its share
of antidumping duties on imported
wooden bedroom furniture from
China. It won’t be a terribly large
check, as the margin —or price adjust-
ment between “dumped” and
domestic merchandise — is a low 6.6
percent and Century accounts for just
a small piece of the eligible U.S. 
wooden bedroom furniture market.
But the money is Century’s due for
joining in an antidumping petition
three years ago that claimed Chinese
imports were priced at predatory 
levels, creating what the U.S.
Department of Commerce deemed an
uneven trading field.
The peculiar part: Century
Furniture is a frequent importer of
Chinese wooden bedroom furniture
itself. “Probably 20 to 25 percent of our
wood business is pure imported prod-
uct,” says Maricich, whose office is on
the back end of a 1 million square foot
factory. “We pay the duties just like
everybody else does.”
That means some of the antidump-
ing proceeds it stands to collect used
to be Century’s own money. Like a lot
of other U.S. furniture firms, Century
supplements its domestic production
with cheaper foreign imports. And
these are many of the same firms
claiming that they are being harmed
by unfairly priced imports. As one crit-
ic put it: “Are petitioners really calling
on the federal government to stop
them before they import again?”
In the relatively brief history of
U.S. antidumping trade practices, the
case of wooden bedroom furniture
from China is one of the most infa-
mous. And the seeming incongruity of
domestic producers paying import
duties from one pocket and collecting
duty revenues in the other plays only a
bit part.
The U.S. furniture industry, whose
hub remains in North Carolina and
Southside Virginia, was (and is) divid-
ed over support for the protection.
Furniture retailers and several leading
domestic producers oppose the peti-
tioning producers. The rift is less
about trade, analysts say, than how dif-
ferent players in the furniture market
were gaming U.S. trade policy for their
hoped-for advantage.
The theory behind antidumping
laws is that they prevent foreign com-
petitors from using rock-bottom
prices to drive domestic firms out of
business. Once they have gained
monopoly power, the thinking goes,
foreign firms can then hike prices to
the roof. In this scenario, both domes-
tic businesses and consumers could be
hurt. It is for this possibility that the
mantra of “fair trade” often trumps its
“free” counterpart.
The problem with antidumping
policy, a broad range of economists
agree, is that it ensnares business prac-
tices that go well beyond actual
predatory pricing. In particular, econ-
omists argue that antidumping
remedies hurt the domestic economy
as a whole, even as they may benefit a
handful of protected industries. 
Economists also question whether
dumping and predatory pricing are the
threats they’re cracked up to be. U.S.
workers often are more productive
than their foreign counterparts. This
means that the cost differential
between running a business domesti-
cally and one overseas is not as high as
a quick look at wage rates would 
suggest, especially when the products
require relatively high-skilled labor.
Even if domestic producers are tem-
porarily driven out of business, what’s
to stop homeland firms from sprouting
up anew to try to undercut the monop-
oly prices of the foreign firms?
“Antidumping helps some compa-
nies stave off imminent decline,” says
Dan Ikenson, a trade policy analyst
with the Cato Institute. “But most
economists worth their weight 
recognize the costs of antidumping
protection far outweigh the gains.”
Still, what do you do if you are
Century Furniture’s Robert Maricich?
He says he has to pay higher wages and
deal with regulations his overseas
competitors never face. And don’t
even get him started on what he sees as
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China. Meanwhile, flattening sales are
threatening company jobs. His
employees own about one-third of the
company. To Maricich, supporting 
the antidumping investigation was a
clear strategy.
“Frankly, the idea of free trade is
fantastic but the reality is almost
laughable,” says Maricich, who is 
also serving as 2006 chairman of 
the American Home Furnishings
Alliance. 
Fair Trade?
Antidumping has existed as legislation
in the United States since 1921, but it
only emerged as a leading instrument
of trade protection in 1980. It was one
year after the conclusion of the Tokyo
Round of worldwide trade talks, at
which antidumping rules were loos-
ened to include sales below cost, not
just alleged price discrimination. (By
definition, price discrimination is
when a firm charges different cus-
tomers different prices for the same
product.)
At the same time, increased global
trade along with greater international
trade organization discipline — under
the auspices first of the General
Agreements on Tariff and Trade
(GATT) and then, post-1994, of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) —
made governments less willing or able
to raise traditional tariffs or quotas in
response to imports.
In the 1980s, more than 1,600
antidumping cases were filed world-
wide, twice the filing rate of the 1970s.
Filings in the 1990s spiked at more
than 300 in 1992 and then peaked in
2001 at more than 350, with members
of the European Union and the United
States the top filers.
U.S. firms got extra incentive to file
antidumping petitions in 2000 with
the passage of the Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act,
informally known as the Byrd
Amendment after its sponsor, Sen.
Robert Byrd, D-W.Va. The Byrd
amendment allowed U.S. companies to
keep revenue from import duties
imposed on their foreign competitors,
instead of having it go to the federal
government as before. “A domestic
producer gets a huge incentive to file
an antidumping investigation,” says
Meredith Crowley, an economist who
studies trade policy at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago. “If you suc-
ceed, you not only get protection from
imports but you actually get a subsidy
from foreign producers, so it’s a huge
financial gain.”
(Bowing to pressure from WTO
members and even the White House,
lawmakers repealed the Byrd amend-
ment in December. But the payments
will continue until 2007.)
In the only analysis of its kind,
Bruce Blonigen, a University of
Oregon economist and leading trade
policy analyst, put the 1993 welfare
loss of U.S. antidumping policy at
between $2 billion and $4 billion,
(which in today’s currency would 
top out at close to $5 billion). While
usually a boon for select domestic
industries, antidumping duties impose
costs on consumers by making them
pay higher prices. Even bigger in terms
of economic magnitude are the effects
on downstream industry participants.
The steel industry, for example, 
has historically been the biggest 
petitioner for antidumping duties,
with almost half such tariffs imposed
on steel imports. But downstream
from the approximately 160,000 
steelworkers who benefit from such
duties are millions more who work in
metal products and auto parts firms.
In a recent article for the American
Enterprise Institute, economists
Gregory Mankiw and Phillip Swagel
noted that for every steel industry job
saved by tariffs, three downstream
steel industry jobs are lost.
The Process
An antidumping measure takes two
parts: First, to show injury to the
affected industry; second, to confirm
that dumping is happening. About half
the time, the U.S. International Trade
Commission agrees with petitioners
that they are being injured, according
to Blonigen. That’s the first part. Then
comes the dumping evaluation. And
“almost always” the Department of
Commerce finds dumping, he says.
The average dumping margin during
the 1990s was 60 percent.
After the Commerce Department
makes a final determination of 
dumping and sets the margin, respon-
sibility for enforcement goes to the
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol.
Customs won’t let imported goods
under antidumping orders into the
country until the margin is paid or
cash deposits are in place to cover 
the duties.
Does the Department of
Commerce set a too-low bar for deter-
mining “predatory”? All a domestic
firm has to do is show that a foreign
company is selling a product in the
United States at prices lower than in
its home country. But there could be
many strategic business reasons why 
a foreign firm would do that, most
having nothing to do with trying to
gain monopoly power. Sometimes
marketing considerations come into
play. Sometimes, when firms are 
selling below their total costs, they are
still pricing below their variable costs
— but it still gets judged as dumping
through the lens of antidumping rules.
In other cases, a foreign producer may
be charging more in its home market
because there it is selling to smaller
vendors, whereas in the United States,
it is selling to big retailers.
Meanwhile, incentives are distorted.
Domestic producers might keep
prices artificially inflated for the 
purpose of demonstrating that a 
foreign company is setting prices 
too low. Or, as Blonigen suggests, it
may prematurely lay off workers to 
signal distress in advance of an
antidumping petition.
“In some ways Commerce has been
given a mandate that anytime anyone
petitions and says, ‘These guys are sell-
ing at below fair value,’ then they are
entitled to receive an antidumping
remedy,” Blonigen says.
In an e-mail response to questions
for this story, a Commerce representa-
tive noted that there is technically no
“finding” of injury by the department’s
Import Administration: “There is only
a determination that the allegation
meets the necessary statutory criteria
for initiating and conducting an 
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determination does the ITC conduct
its own review, and affirmative deter-
minations are required from both the
Import Administration and ITC
before an order takes effect.
The undeniable upshot of a lot of
antidumping remedies is that foreign
firms simply move their production to
other low-cost countries. If a Chinese
company gets slapped with an
antidumping duty, it might simply
move production to Vietnam, for
example, where it can continue to
keep costs down and offer lower 
prices on exports. And then there is
the incidence of nations whose firms
are hit with antidumping duties 
retaliating with their own duties. Since
1995, the most frequent filers of
antidumping petitions have been
developing countries. Over the past
decade, the United States had faced
158 antidumping investigations from
other countries, trailing only China’s
434 and Korea’s 212.
(The temporary steel tariffs
imposed by the Bush administration in
2002 were not antidumping measures;
they were traditional “safeguard”
measures that don’t allege price 
discrimination as the reason for their
implementation.)
The Department of Commerce
takes issue with any description of its
activities as hampering free trade or
creating unintended consequences.
“Antidumping duties are a WTO-
sanctioned trade remedy that is a 
necessary and fundamental part of the
balance of rights and obligations that
countries voluntarily accept when they
become members of the multilateral
trading system,” Commerce said in an
e-mail response to questions. “In the
United States, administration of 
the antidumping laws is the most
transparent in the world and governed
by strict due process requirements.”
An Application: 
Chinese Bedroom Furniture
Ikenson, the policy analyst at the Cato
Institute, calls the bedroom furniture
case the “poster child for reform” of
U.S. antidumping policy. In a 2004
paper, Ikenson complained about “the
ease of access to a commercially dis-
ruptive weapon that is presumed
naively to be reserved for cases of
unfair trade. In reality, the antidump-
ing law as written and applied is
incapable of identifying unfair trade
and is used with increasing frequency
to hamper legitimate competition.” As
you might expect, some U.S. furniture
producers take a different view,
although even they are candid about
the shortfalls of antidumping policy.
Under the banner “American
Furniture Manufacturers Committee
for Legal Trade,” eight U.S. furniture
companies and six labor unions filed
their petition on Oct. 31, 2003. The
domestic manufacturers of beds, night
stands, armoires, and dressers claimed
that Chinese-made bedroom furniture
imports were flooding the U.S. market
at low prices. In 2003, China accounted
for about half of all wooden bedroom
furniture imports, more than 
double its share two years earlier. The
domestic industry calculated it lost 
15 percentage points of market share,
thanks to the cheap imports.
Vaughan Furniture of Galax, Va.,
had 1,500 employees and five factories
at the time of the petition filing. “We
felt like it was our best opportunity to
save those factories,” says Bill
Vaughan, chief executive of Vaughan
Furniture, which was founded by his
grandfather and great uncle. “We felt
like they [China] were dumping on
some products. Their prices were so
low, so much lower than what our
material costs were.”
Among the opponents was
Furniture Brands International (FBI),
the largest U.S. furniture maker. FBI,
which keeps significant operations in
North Carolina under brands like
Thomasville and Drexel Heritage, cast
the case as nothing more than strate-
gic maneuvering. Additionally, FBI
questioned the gall of U.S. producers
who frequently import Chinese bed-
room furniture. This suggests
producers whose “very own actions
have caused them injury.” For its part,
Furniture Brands wanted no part of
Countercyclical
Antidumping investigations tend to spike during economic downturns and fall during expansions.
NOTE: Data through 1997 are from the Journal of World Trade; after 1997, from the World Trade Organization.






























































Sthe effort, citing its own import activ-
ity. “It serves the company no purpose
to have tariffs imposed on that prod-
uct,” says company spokesman Marty
Richmond. “It’s the consumer in the
end that will pay these tariffs … And if
the demand for furniture is elastic,
higher prices don’t serve anyone.”
The petitioners sought antidump-
ing margins of between 40 percent and
400 percent, enough to significantly
dampen imports as well as give hand-
some windfalls to their own coffers
thanks to the Byrd Amendment. On
Nov. 9, 2004, the Department of
Commerce announced its final deci-
sion: Antidumping duties averaging
6.6 percent would be placed on
Chinese wooden bedroom furniture
imports. Though technically a win for
the petitioners, there were no victory
celebrations. The 6.6 percent margin
was considered too low to have much
impact, and that was an astute 
observation, judging from what’s 
happened since.
Vaughan Furniture has gone from
five factories to one since the filing
and laid off more than 1,000 workers,
bringing its head count to just 350
today. It was the largest downsizing in
the privately held company’s 83-year
history.
Bill Vaughan says it’s been a diffi-
cult time. He tells workers it wasn’t
their fault. “If we had been successful
in getting a high enough tariff, my
guess is we would have saved some
jobs,” he says. “However, the
[antidumping margin] was so low, we
have been unable to save any.”
Low margin or not, the decline in
domestic furniture manufacturing has
been all encompassing. Petition oppo-
nent Furniture Brands International
since 2001 has shut 31 factories and cut
about 8,000 employees. (Of its
remaining 26 plants, 18 are in North
Carolina and two are in Virginia.)
Much of the cutbacks have been in
wooden furniture production.
But Furniture Brands managers do
not blame imports. “The strategy in
dealing with imports in a broader
sense has been a blended strategy of
domestic manufacturing and sourced
product,” Richmond says. Specifically,
low-end products which can be
churned out through largely automated
factories tend to be set up offshore;
high-end products require more 
customization and closely controlled
labor that is more widely accessible in
the United States.
The End of Antidumping?
With the start of the Doha round of
global trade talks in 2001, the push for
antidumping reform picked up pace,
even with initial U.S. opposition. But
reform may not even be necessary.
Measured both by number of cases
filed and by fraction of goods imported,
antidumping cases are being initiated
with much less frequency in this 
century.
The downward slope of worldwide
investigations has been plain, with 364
cases as recently as 2001 but with a
projected 200 cases in 2005. The
United States has also seen a signifi-
cant reduction in cases filed, with just
four antidumping and countervailing
duty investigations during the first
half of 2005.
A lot of this may have to do with
the countercyclical nature of
antidumping; usually, investigations
increase as the economy sours, as
industries look for an edge wherever
they can find it. It also may be that
fewer industries need protection.
There aren’t a whole lot more prod-
ucts out there that haven’t been
slapped with antidumping orders. As
of Dec. 31 there remained 333
antidumping and countervailing duty
orders in place.
But this falloff in investigations
may be different, some analysts say.
Globalization may have reached the
point that it’s no longer prudent for
domestic firms to wage tariff wars
with their trading partners, because
production is so intertwined over
international borders. “Today’s supply
chains are internationalized. If you
rely on a producer from Indonesia, it’s
unseemly to be seen by foreign affili-
ates as engaging in this kind of
protection,” says Cato’s Ikenson.
Unseemly or not, it’s still practiced.
But to what effect? Century Furniture
has cut about 300 workers over the
past four years, bringing its current
head count to about 1,200 employees
across seven factories in the Hickory
region.
Nowadays, the focus at Century is
on high-end furniture targeted at
designers, a move away from the more
import-vulnerable low-end business.
Employees are keenly aware of their
precarious situation, Maricich says.
Even as they continue to support 
the antidumping stance, Century’s
workers are concentrating on new
ways to compete in a globally sourced
environment. “When you’re sitting 
in this district and watching what’s
happened with textiles and now 
furniture, it’s psychologically very
frightening,” Maricich says. “But one
of the interesting outgrowths of this is
the success we’ve had in changing.
Virtually everyone here is open to
change. They realize they have to 
be open.”                RF
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